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Nudging
In both developing and developed countries, health ministries 
closely examine use of so-called nudges to promote population 
health and welfare. Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, who 
developed the concept, define a nudge as “any aspect of the 
choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable 
way without forbidding any options or significantly changing 
their economic incentives. To count as a nudge, the intervention 
must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates” (1).
Two examples may illustrate this notion. Placing healthier food 
items at the cafeteria entrance and at eye level so that clients 
make healthier food choices is a nudge, according to Sunstein 
and Thaler. So are opt-out arrangements for cadaveric organ 
donation, so that more organs would be volunteered. 
Nudges affect choice using neither rational persuasion nor 
restrictive means like mandates and substantial fines. Any 
pressure they apply is soft (2). In the cafeteria food choice 
example, the only ‘cost’ to customers who insist on unhealthy 
food choice is having to take a few steps to the other end of 
the cafeteria, where unhealthy food items are found. Nor 
do any nudges that Sunstein and Thaler would support 
include lies, deceit, subliminal advertising, or other powerful 
manipulation. Strong material incentives are also ruled out. 
The hope is that although the pressure that nudges exert is soft, 
nudges could affect choice considerably and improve health 
and welfare a lot. For instance, predictably, many customers 
will choose food placed at the entrance and at their eye level. 
Sunstein and Thaler explain that nudges are able to do so by 
exploiting our merely bounded rationality, as delineated by 
behavioral psychology in recent decades. Nudges allegedly 
make us healthier or happier without jeopardizing our 
freedom of choice.
It is an interesting philosophical question whether, so 
understood, nudges are possible at all. If so many of us 
predictably pick healthy food when it is placed in front of us, 
does not that mean or indicate that we are somehow forced 
to choose it, or are subtly but irresistibly manipulated? How 
can something tend so reliably to elicit a determinate choice 
without having forced that choice? Elsewhere I plan to explore 
how nudges may have this ‘magical’ effect. Our focus here 
is one account. It explains that while in nudges, nothing is 
objectively forcing the healthy choice, subjectively a strong 
desire issues or the nudge undercuts rational calculations, 
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culminating in widespread response. In the cafeteria example, 
exceeding laziness or hyperbolic discounting makes most of 
us disproportionately averse to taking a few steps to the back 
of the cafeteria, or our appetite concentrates only around what 
we see first and blocks appetite for alternatives. This is not a 
rational response on our parts but the result is that we pick the 
first item we see.
This editorial does not question or defend this understanding 
of some nudges’ mechanism of action. Instead it advances 
two hypotheses regarding the connection between nudging 
so characterized and shame, understood broadly to include 
embarrassment, stigma effects, and any compunction in 
general. One hypothesis I advance is that shame can serve 
in nudging. Another hypothesis is more critical. It states that 
nudging can instigate shame, which more restrictive measures 
to improve health would not.
These two hypotheses bear on the possibility and on the 
advisability of using nudges to promote personal and 
population health. They also bear on the cogency of the 
so-called least restrictive alternative principle in public 
health policy.
Nudging by shaming
One hypothesis is that shaming can be used for nudging  as 
characterized above because shame can affect our choices 
a lot while objectively limiting our freedom of choice only 
little. The high impact of smoke-free legislation may rely in 
part on nudges that work this way. Zoning regulations create 
slight stigma, which may be objectively a trifle but which 
we dread. The same goes for the high impact of Directly 
Observed Therapy (DOT) for tuberculosis, which makes 
medical noncompliance awkward and embarrassing—again 
an objective trifle that we dread. Finally, whether New York 
City’s potential ban on the sale of extra-large sugary drinks 
in movie theaters and other venues will work or founder will 
depend in part on whether enough residents will feel too 
embarrassed to order multiple soda cups and refills. Let me 
elaborate on each of these cases. 
Smoke-free regulation
Around the turn of the millennium, countries, towns 
and workplaces the world over introduced restrictions 
on the geographical zones where smoking is allowed. 
These restrictions seem to have had a remarkable effect on 
smoking rates (3–7). 
This public health triumph is worth explaining. For decades, 
public health anti-smoking campaigns met with little success. 
How did restrictions that make smoking only slightly less 
convenient (e.g. by forcing smokers to step outside certain 
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buildings to smoke, or perhaps to stand a few steps away) have 
had such large effect on smoking prevalence? Many accounts 
can be given for this development. We shall focus on one 
account: that the process was mediated through subtle stigma. 
Being ‘banished’ for a few minutes from a building, to stand 
outside in a ‘no-man’s land’, steps away, stresses us more than 
it objectively ‘should’, by instigating significant shame. Zoning 
laws impose no physical pain, no major burden and no fine 
(unlike e.g. negative subsidies for cigarettes). Any stigma they 
create is ‘lite’ (unlike refusal to hire smokers, which may count 
as severe stigma). Normally they involve no utter humiliation 
and dehumanization or a level of shame that threatens 
personal integrity. And yet, social animals are cued to react 
strongly to any signals of banishment. So the specter of even 
minor stigma prompts many smokers to smoke less or to quit. 
While additional mechanisms certainly explain the vast effect 
of smoke-free legislation (obviously secondhand smoking 
decreases when more smoking takes place outside shared 
spaces), the stigma and shame just delineated may form part 
of the reason. If so, smoke-free regulation is arguably an 
instance of successful nudging for public health.
Directly observed therapy
In DOT, a standardized treatment regimen, typically to cure 
tuberculosis (TB), is being directly observed by a healthcare 
worker or community health worker. This curative strategy 
is recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
as the most effective way to stop the spread of TB in 
communities with a high incidence (8,9). Short course DOT 
for TB is among the most cost-effective medical interventions 
in existence (10). 
DOT does not include mandates to ingest one’s pills or formal 
sanctions for non-compliers. In fact, WHO emphasizes that 
treatment observers must remain ‘acceptable to the patient’ 
and that the entire approach must remain ‘patient centered’ 
(9). What makes it the case, then, that mere watching of pill 
ingestion has such strong effect on whether patients will 
take their pills? Since observing is unaccompanied by the 
threat of penalty, how can it wield so much influence? The 
explanation is not simply that observers remind patients to do 
something that fundamentally these patients are committed 
to doing. Even in comparison to a far more intense regimen 
of text message reminders to ingest one’s pills (coupled with 
some awkward human contact: a phone call in the event of 
recurring noncompliance), the evidence does not show that 
short course DOT is any the less effective (11). 
Part of the reason for DOT’s high effectiveness may be that 
the live presence of another person makes nonadherence 
highly embarrassing. That other person may lack the 
institutional power to force patients to take their pills. But 
it would usually be too embarrassing for patients—too 
socially awkward—to send her away with no results. Patients 
have the freedom to do so, but a vast majority chooses not 
to disappoint the observer and takes their pills. Objectively, 
sheer embarrassment is not profoundly bad for us, but social 
animals are disproportionately averse to it as well (12). 
If this is a genuine part of DOT’s mechanism of action, then it 
is arguably a nudge for health. 
The super-size soda cup ban
On June 26, 2014,  New York City lost its final appeal to ban 
the sale of 16 oz or larger cups of high-calorie beverages 
in some public spaces. The proposed ban met with many 
objections (13,14), one was that residents would remain 
free to buy several small cups or refills (15). That made 
the ban futile for opponents and not-overly-restrictive for 
proponents. In that respect, the success or failure of the ban, 
had it been implemented, would have depended on that of a 
shame-based nudge. The ban might have worked if enough 
customers with weight problems turned out to feel too 
embarrassed to buy several cups for themselves, or to return 
for a refill. Objectively, customers would remain free to buy 
and consume a large quantity of sugary soda. But under the 
gaze of other customers and vendors, at least, many might 
choose not to exercise that freedom.
Whether or not this calculation pans out in reality (once 
other jurisdictions introduce similar bans) remains anybody’s 
guess. My point is that the proposed ban’s effectiveness will 
hinge in part on whether it associates certain choices, such as 
buying multiple cups for oneself, with minor shame (and on 
whether societies will tolerate policy that must induce slight 
shame if it is to succeed).
Shaming by nudging
Nudging can also relate to shame in a more problematic way. 
A pitfall in the use of nudges is their potential to instigate 
pointless and sometimes serious and alarming shame, as 
an unintended side effect. This potential can make the use 
of nudges wrong in some contexts and some variants. It 
also indicates a problem with the least restrictive alternative 
principle in public health ethics.
Let me explain. The said attraction of nudging is that it is 
relatively non-restrictive—nudges are not mandates. However, 
highly restrictive measures can have some advantages as such, 
but they  give us what are perceived as ‘good excuses’. Because 
measures tagged as less restrictive do not provide perceived 
good excuses, nudging can instigate shame and guilt feelings 
which more restrictive interventions for personal and public 
health would not. 
To elaborate, we rarely hold people fully responsible for choices 
made under duress, for example, for choices forced by violent 
threats. Nor do we hold people responsible for choices made 
under conditions of deceit, irresistible manipulation, and so 
forth. Less restrictive measures—including most nudges—are 
perceived as non-exculpatory (or as far less exculpatory), even 
when these measures predictably affect our choices as much. 
When the choices thus prompted run counter to choosers’ 
or to their social circles’ deep moral, personal, and religious 
commitments, they might prompt broadly construed shame 
and social penalties. 
This becomes a problem when nudges are used for 
health promotion but against patients’ own fundamental 
commitments or those of their immediate community’s. 
If a nudge preserves free choice, and succumbing to it is 
totally avoidable, there is a worry that patients would be 
held responsible by themselves and by their peers for healthy 
choices that nevertheless violate their basic values. Patients 
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would feel painful compunction or encounter social sanctions 
from which more restrictive methods would have saved them. 
In that respect, even when nudges successfully promote 
patients’ health, they may set up patients for perceived 
moral or religious failure, and for the serious shame or 
strong banishment that may ensue. This illustrates, yet again 
(16–18), that having less choice is sometimes better for us. 
It also questions the least restrictive alternative principle in 
public health ethics. 
Consider the examples of accepting medical services from 
medical students, and of donation of cadaveric organs.
Opt-out of reliance on doctors in training
In university hospitals around the world, some services are 
performed by medical students. This is an essential part of 
their training, and a future public health need. However, 
depending on the exact level of supervision, trainees’ success 
rates can be far lower than those of trained medical personnel. 
That difference can be dramatic, for example, in the case of 
certain surgeries (19).
How to allocate fairly and sensibly among patients the risks 
from doctors’ training (19)? While no guidelines are currently 
being implemented uniformly on this matter, the de facto 
solution is often as follows. Students partake in care quite 
fully but when a patient or her relatives vehemently object, 
procedures are performed by trained staff not students. 
If you will, this is an opt-out approach to reliance on clinicians 
in training, and a nudge. The default is such that most patients 
will predictably forego ensuring that only trained personnel 
attends to them (partly because many patients and their 
families are too embarrassed to insist), but all maintain their 
freedom to receive services from trained personnel, because 
all would get them if they insisted enough. 
Is this nudge a good solution? What about a more restrictive 
mandate that stated that patients who wish to continue to be 
seen in an academic medical facility with all its advantages, 
including the constant monitoring, study, and improvement 
of practices and the available  innovations, and to enjoy 
services from staff trained at some risk to previous patients, 
must accept the related risks as well? Services from doctors in 
training will be frequently offered at academic centers, always 
allocated impartially (say, by lottery). Patients who insist on 
refusing them will have to move elsewhere for treatment and 
perhaps pay steep fines. Would not such a mandate be fairer 
and preferable in our context?
One argument against an opt-out nudge and in favor of a 
more restrictive mandate revolves around shame. The current 
opt-out solution relies on the prediction that many patients 
and their relatives will forego optimal care, although they had 
the freedom to demand and receive it. This solution promotes 
population health at some unnecessary psychosocial risk. 
Imagine that something goes awry and an aging parent or a 
young child suffers permanent disability because of choices 
made by her surrogate decision makers. Feelings of shame 
or guilt might arise, and mutual accusations might run high. 
By contrast, a mandate that left relatives (and patients) no 
choice except to receive services from medical students would 
exculpate decision makers completely. In that respect, a 
mandate would have been preferable. While a full assessment 
of the nudge and the mandate remains beyond our scope, we 
can affirm that in one respect, a more restrictive intervention 
would as such have an edge over a less restrictive nudge.
A mainstay of standard public health ethics is the ‘least 
restrictive alternative’ principle (20–22). It states, roughly, 
that less restrictive and less intrusive interventions for public 
health should be preferred to more intrusive and restrictive 
ones, at least when the expected effects on health are similar. 
If restrictive mandates have an advantage over nudges, 
perhaps the least restrictive alternative principle should be re-
examined (23).
Opt-out for cadaveric organ donation
Most Islamic scholars fully endorse organ donation, but a 
significant minority of (usually Indo-Asian) Muslim scholars, 
imams, and doctors continue to oppose organ donation, 
especially post mortem (24,25). Thus, even if population 
health or even the correct interpretation of the Qur’an support 
transplantation and organ donation from the deceased, many 
individuals see cadaveric donation as a forbidden violation 
of the body. Many families would be morally disappointed 
with a relative’s permission to use his or her body parts 
after her death.
Sunstein and Thaler discuss opt-out policies for organ 
donation. Their optimism about the effects of these policies 
on the organ pool notwithstanding, they remain perfectly 
open to an alternate policy, of mandated choice (in which 
people must decide whether to become organ donors—or 
face criminal penalties). As they explain, an opt-out policy in 
which the default is set at donation would sometimes wind up 
harvesting organs from citizens who deeply oppose donation 
and who had left defaults in place only because they are averse 
to making choices (1,18). One interpretation of their concern 
focuses on the shame that such a default arrangement might 
impose on such donors and their families. 
Another way around this pitfall is to restrict use of nudging 
only to areas where the patient’s own fundamental values 
agree with those of the intervention. So for example for those 
patients who are (far) more committed to maintaining the 
integrity of their bodies post mortem than to improving others’ 
health, opt-out nudging would not be used. Interestingly, 
that’s also an aspect of Sunstein and Thaler’s approach, since 
for them (for quite a different reason), nudges must make 
people’s lives go better ‘as judged by their own preferences, 
not those of some bureaucrat’ (1). 
I do not mean to suggest here that concerns about shame are 
decisive against the use of nudges for increasing the organ 
pool, just that they, can count somewhat against it. A solution 
of mandated (cadaveric) organ donation (26) would have 
the advantage of exculpating patients from accusations of a 
perceived choice to violate religious mores. But it has other 
drawbacks (27).
Conclusion: nudges, shame, and the least restrictive 
alternative principle
Nudging is an important addition to the armamentarium 
of measures to promote personal and public health. Its 
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connection to shame, stigma, and embarrassment is complex. 
Shame enables some nudges and makes others problematic. 
This connection merits further investigation. In addition, 
the least restrictive alternative principle in public health is 
not quite accurate. Interventions for health that are more 
restrictive are sometimes preferable as such. 
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